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Abstract 
 
This master thesis examines the impact of Relationship Lending on insolvency 
companies for small and medium companies under restructuring or insolvency 
in Portugal. Although there is a lot of research that relates relationship lending 
with capital structure and banks, there is not so much related companies with 
insolvency. Our goal is to check the impacts that relationship lending has on 
those types of companies, mainly exploring the number of banks that each 
company works with and also a comparison on the leverage side to check what 
companies are better, those which are in PER process (judicial restructuring 
process) or those who are not. The PER process data was obtained by from 
CITIUS database and SABI database and comparables companies (by size, 
industry and employees) data was obtained on SABI database. The econometric 
method used was the Probit regression, analysing companies entering PER 
process and companies that did not enter PER process. For the analysis we aim 
to answer the following question: What is the impact of relationship lending in 
restructuring companies in Portugal? 
Our research shows that there is a positive impact of the number of Banks that 
the companies work with and also of leverage. Considering the size and the 
measure of profitability which is the return on assets, there is a negative 
correlation between these and the probability of entering PER process. 
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Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
  
This master thesis aims to examine the influence of relationship lending in 
restructuring companies (in our case small and medium enterprises) in Portugal. 
We have selected SME´s because these are the majority of companies’ existent in 
Portugal with almost 99,9%.  Our goal is to understand the relationship of banks 
with those SME´s that are in a process of restructuring.  Many of these companies 
in the case of Portugal must create a plan to improve their financial accounts and 
pay the debt to its stakeholders. The data obtained was from CITIUS database 
(companies that have PER process) and then by the sector, size and employees 
we built a comparable number PER sample of companies. This restructuring plan 
is called PER (Plano Especial de Revitalização) and is legally enforced. The SME´s 
that have this plan are in a financial deterioration process if they don´t change 
their financial decisions and save the company. We want to understand how 
much of these companies in PER process observe high levels of relationship 
lending.  
To understand the meanings and all implications that result from the 
relationship lending with the SME, we must know what it is and the positives or 
negatives consequences for companies. 
We will try to answer the following question: What is the impact of 
relationship lending with restructuring companies in Portugal? 
In chapter 2 we review the existent literature on relationship lending and 
company insolvency. Also, we review the factors that can have an impact on the 
results that we want to answer. 
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In chapter 3 we describe the method used on the empirical analysis and how 
we have obtained the data. In this chapter we describe that one part of the data 
was obtained in CITIUS (Portuguese public Database of companies in 
insolvency), the companies that had PER process, and we have obtained 
comparables by size, industry and employees in SABI database. We describe the 
method used Probit and its characteristics. 
In chapter 4 we describe the first analysis done and also the main results for 
answer the research question. 
In chapter 5 we conclude that we find a positive correlation between the 
probability of entering PER process with the leverage levels and also with the 
number of banks that the companies work with. Also, taking in consideration the 
size and the measure of profitability which is the return on assets, there is a 
negative correlation between these and the probability of entering PER process. 
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Chapter 2  
2.Relationship Lending and Company 
Insolvency 
2.1. Relationship Lending    
 
We must start by defining what is relationship lending and also what are 
restructuring companies. Then we will further develop these subjects more 
deeply. First relationship lending is considered by many authors as the link that 
companies have with banks when managing loans by direct contact between the 
loaner and the borrower. Udell (2006) says that relationship lending is mainly 
obtained on soft information.  This soft information is obtained by direct contact 
between the loaner and an SME as it is related to loans, where the financial 
institution can have better information. This is not yet a very studied matter 
because in some cases it is difficult to find this link between companies and 
financial institutions. This difficulty is made by the fact that companies in a global 
world have more than one financial institution to finance and aid their activities. 
As studied by Memmel, Schmieder, & Stein(2008), one measure to see the 
relationship lending with the companies is the amount of debt that a bank 
delivers to a company. As we want to check the impact that relationship lending 
has with restructuring SME this will be used for this paper.  Also studied by 
Sapienza (2002)and Udell (2006) are bank sizes. The information that they 
provide us is that big financial institutions have higher advantages regarding the 
SME that have hard information and the small financial institutions have a high 
advantage on soft information. The amount of loans is analysed by each loan 
4 
Telmo Dias Carvalho Marques Maia 
officer which gathers information about their costumer so the bank can perform 
a better decision for each and every customer. Many of these contracts if analysed 
show the importance of the loan officer role in the decision making of the bank. 
As studied by Sandeep Dahiya, and Anthony Sauders (2017) the rules of many 
banks limit their loans losses. As stated by Udell (2006) and Badulescu & 
Badulescu (2012) smaller institutions provide higher loan levels to SME than 
compared to bigger financial institutions. All financial institutions not only 
consider big firms but also SME because the latter are highly profitable and a 
continuous growing sector. Regarding this situation, this is only for prevention 
of bankruptcy of the banks if in an imaginary but possible situation the banks 
started to deliver loans to bad companies.  These bad companies the first thing 
that do is to pay their debt, leaving the bank debt as a second plan. The banks, 
despite of being bigger or smaller, all have an important role in the relationship 
lending as they primarily have insider information or more private information 
before anyone else. As they have a closer contact with the smaller companies they 
are more involved and can have better contracts and information. By the 
information provided they have an advantage in gathering information before 
the market. Also, it is used for analysing the debt status, the changes on some 
loans contracts and decisions that the bank might use to recover the loans 
amounts. Every bank can secure some of the decisions before bad news comes 
public because in this way the bank will suffer just some losses. These losses 
affect the banks because they have relationship lending with the companies that 
could go possibly in the wrong way. 
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2.2. Asymmetric Information 
 
Typically, a restructuring company, in our case, is almost in insolvency, but 
can be recovered because it still has valuable assets and the amount of debt is 
typically high. Most of these have high debt levels and may not pay their taxes, 
salaries and also loans. We analyse the number of Banks as a measure of 
relationship lending. Banks that have stronger relationships with the companies 
have more information compared to other banks that are starting a lending 
relationship with the same company.   As stated on Petersen & Rajan (1995) small 
and medium enterprises are highly dependent from Banks. We need to define 
hard information and soft information. Hard information is the information that 
can be provided easily to external institutions, normally in numbers, so that it 
can be easily compared with other types of information of different companies. 
Instead, soft information, is that information that Banks use in relationship 
lending because this information does not imply only on numbers as hard 
information. This is related to the relations between the Banks and the managers 
and how these last ones behave in changes on the market, as well as judgements. 
This connection between Banks and companies makes easier to gather 
information from the companies as this relation is very close. The bigger Banks 
that provide loans based on soft information have less efficiency in terms of 
relationship lending compared to smaller ones. This leads to what is considered 
as asymmetric information.” Asymmetric information, as the adjective indicates, refers 
to situations, in which some agent in a trade possesses information while other agents 
involved in the same trade do not. “ as designated in (The World Bank, Quy-Toan, 2003) 
.  The adverse selection, monitoring cost and moral hazard are the three main 
aspects of asymmetric information that we will discuss in this thesis.  The first 
one, adverse selection is defined as the lender not being capable to differentiate 
two projects when conceding the loan. The lender tends to give the loan to a safer 
6 
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project than a riskier one. As stated by Schoar (2012) the companies have more 
hesitation when they enter in the default mechanism towards a specific person 
than a private Bank.   
One aspect of soft information or qualitative information is that, it is costly and 
which is highly transferable with a lower cost (Cornée, 2014). 
Moral Hazard is on the borrower side when he changes the goal of the initial 
project. The company initially says that will apply for some investment and in 
the end will provide the loan money to another use. This link between companies 
and Banks in terms of relationship lending leads to a wrong sense that this 
relation can have a higher cost regarding the banks that have provided the loans. 
Also, Moral Hazard has an important role when companies request loans as this 
influence the interest rates of loans (Arnoud, Boot, & Thakor, 1994). The third 
monitoring costs is also on the borrower´s side as it intends to take advantage of 
informing lower to state the earnings than it was supposed (Bebczuk, 2003). As 
mentioned above the banks who provide higher amount of loans have more and 
better information about the companies (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). If we think of 
the present, this could be a reason for the crisis that we have recently lived. If a 
bank decreases the total amount of credit loaned to a company it somehow 
increases the possibility of defaulting from the companies (Elsas, 2005). So, the 
banks don´t do that, instead, they keep loaning. However, many times the 
companies forget financial support and they go insolvent anyway. 
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2.3. Restructuring Companies in Portugal 
 
Historically introducing this, as in Oliveira (2012) and Vasconcelos (2017) in 
the 60´s in Portugal there was a legal code of bankruptcy in which the main goal 
was the prevention of companies bankruptcy1. Two instruments existed, the 
“concordata”2 and the “acordo de credores”3. The first instrument has the 
objective of trying to get something from the company before everything was lost 
and unrecoverable. The owner of the company before being totally unrecoverable 
had to go to court and call all of his creditors in a meeting to try saving his 
business. The second instrument was applied if the first would not get approval 
by all parties. This instrument created a new company (limited liability company) 
with the intention of saving the activity. If none of these were approved by the 
court the company was declared bankrupt.  
In the 70´s were created several instruments. One of them was the viability 
contract “Contrato de Viabilidade”. The difference was that this contract must be 
submitted to the Government with the proposal of the creditors. 
Then, in the 80´s, was initially created the first court process to recover the 
companies.  This process had to be submitted by the owner of the company in 
court with measures that could recover the company.  This measure was then 
approved by the creditors.  
In the 90´s was improved the previous law and a new code designated as 
CPEREF( Codigo de Processo Especial de Recuperação da Empresa e da 
Falencia)4 was introduced. This code has differentiated the bankruptcy and 
recovery of a company.  The owners of the companies that were in this way, they 
                                                 
1 See Decreto-Lei nº 177/86, of 2/7 
2 See art. 20º Decreto- Lei 177/86, of 2/7 
3 See art 26º Decreto- Lei 177/86, of 2/7 
4 See Decreto-Lei nº 132/93, of 23/4 
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had a similar process at the beginning, in the case of bankrupt or recovery. If the 
company was shown as economically viable the process then was changed to the 
recovery, on the contrary, the company was declared bankrupt. 
In the actual days, the code that is published is CIRE (Codigo da Insolvencia e 
da Recuperação de Empresas)5. The big difference to the old laws is that all 
creditors have the possibility of choosing what is the best solution to recover their 
money, either by liquidation, recovery or having the company integrated into the 
insolvency mass.  For the last two, it has to be an insolvency plan 
The insolvency plan, if approved, has all the conditions for making the 
payments to the creditors while the company has the possibility to be alive and 
in a long-term to growth. When is declared insolvency, there is no possibility of 
buying things with a loan, it has to be an immediate payment of all.  
In the Portuguese case restructuring companies when they are facing very 
hard difficulties and cannot pay their obligations, mostly are forced to enter 
insolvency. Some companies make the PER for trying to solve some issues and 
“stand up again “in their day by day activities. The main goal of PER is not 
terminating the company but getting the company “good”.  Normally if a 
company has asked for an insolvency plan and then has required the PER, the 
first one is suspended. This plan is submitted to the voting of the stakeholders 
and it must be approved by 2/3 of them. Finally it gets the approval of the court. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 See Decreto- Lei nº 53/2004, of 18/3 
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2.4. Relationship Lending and Default Companies 
 
In a globalized world we observe an even higher competition on the banking 
industry. Banks nowadays are competing for better loans, better market shares 
and better interest rate.  This competition is increasing year by year but some of 
them, that maybe can have incorrect information by some companies, can enter 
into difficulties. The reason why banks keep this is that they have lower losses 
when entering in default and lower incentive for risk. This also can happen to 
companies who face their sector with high competitiveness as the cases of 
technological companies. There are 3 main factors that banks take in 
consideration when analysing companies, which are the relationship lending, the 
financial statements and finally the collateral6 or the guarantee pledged. (Dima & 
Vasilache, 2016). This collateral has a negative correlation with loans risk, 
meaning that when companies do not want to be “open” to the risk, they choose 
the loan contracts with higher collateral. Thus we also have the inverse, 
companies that are willing to take the risk choose loan contracts with lower or no 
collateral at all.  
When we speak about default risk (Bester, 1994) we need to infer the 
correlations between these and collateral. There is a positive correlation between 
the risk of defaulting and collateral.  Normally banks have the tendency to 
provide loans to companies that are accepting the risk. 
Regarding relationship lending. that is an important player on these cases is 
one determinant of collateral.  When a company is turning to default, let´s put 
this way, normally banks take high interest rates and want an insurance (in this 
case the collateral). Also, we have the other way around, that is when the bank 
                                                 
6 Collateral by definition means when a company is making a loan contract that this last one 
gives to the bank an asset so that it can secure the loan. If the company stops paying the loan, the 
bank can use that asset in order to regain is losses. 
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check that the company is losing the risk of default, then the bank no longer 
requires such high interest rates and also the insurance that has previously 
obtained from the company does no longer have the need to exist. So, the relation 
between relationship lending and collateral has a negative correlation. As 
informed previously, the companies have more intensive relations with the 
banks also have better contracts as the soft information is the major information 
required by the banks. 
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Chapter 3 
3.Methodology and Data 
3.1. Methodology  
 
For our quantitative analysis of the impact of relationship lending in company 
restructuring in Portugal we use a binary model probit model.  In our case, we 
analyse whether the company enters a PER process or not. The dependent 
variable will take 0 value or 1 depending if it did not enter the PER process or if 
did, respectively. The general framework of probability models, as presented by 
Greene (2003) is  
 
Prob(event j occurs) = Prob(Y = j) = F[relevant effects, parameters]    
(1) 
 In this case, we take in account the option of having or not having PER 
process, we can say that the probability of one is higher than the other.  
 
 Prob[Y = 1|w, za, zb]        
 = Prob[xβ + ε > 0 | x] 
(2) 
 
As for a quick overview of how the model checks the variables, we can see 
from the graph below. 
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Y=0 Y=1 
 
Figure 1- Probit Model 
 
The parameters xβ in Greene (2003) are designated for the total observations 
of the difference between the utility functions and the parameter ε as designated 
the error term where are all the variables that could not be observed are.  The 
error term is normally distributed and independent. 
 
As the Probit model is considered one main binary model, for the objective of 
estimating the data that we have obtained it is usually used the method of 
maximum likelihood. The model is by Greene (2003) no more no less than taking 
each observation as part of Bernoulli distribution. The part that has a success 
probability F(xβ) and independent observations, takes to what is designated as 
joint probability or likelihood function. 
 
Prob(Y1 = y1, Y2=y2,…Yn=yn|X)=∏ [1 - F(xiβ)] ∏ F(xiβ). 
 
(3) 
 
Normally statistics programs compute the maximum likelihood function 
without logarithms as a method to infer the value of β that maximizes the 
probability of the Data Greene (2003): 
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𝜕𝐿𝑛
𝜕𝛽
= ∑ [
𝑦𝑖𝑓𝑖
𝐹𝑖
+ (1 − 𝑦𝑖)
−𝑓𝑖
(1 − 𝑓𝑖)
]
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑋𝑖 = 0 
(4) 
For the above equation 𝑓𝑖 is the density function. 
Usually, the probit maximum likelihood estimator is designated as a quasi-
maximum likelihood estimator designated by QMLE Kuan (2004). Correctly 
performed  plim(1/n)?̂? = plim(1/n)(− ?̂? ). In this method, we have to designate 
the density function for the mean of the function.  It is called as quasi because it 
is gathered from the maximum likelihood function.  If this is correctly performed 
persons considers this as the true maximum likelihood estimator but one thing 
has to be said. This can be as described if we consider all variables for the study 
performed. This can give a lot of work to several investigators and it is only 
possible to get only some variables for the study performed.  The goal is only to 
study the main variables as by this method taking in consideration that the 
results are similar as the dependent variable 
 
The main properties are: 
• Consistency -  The quasi-maximum likelihood estimator is poor 
consistent 𝑝 lim
𝑛→∞
?̂?𝑀𝐿 = 𝛽. This means that the maximum likelihood 
estimator for infinitesimal numbers it is the same as the estimator of 
the study. Also, the consistency is not the same if we have 
heteroscedasticity, the heterogeneity that possible is not measured 
correctly, the other variables that are omitted or errors in the 
assumption of distribution (Douc, Fokianos, & Moulines,  2017). 
 
• Asymptotic Normality – The maximum likelihood estimator will tend 
to  ≈N(β, I (𝛽)−1). Here the matrix asymptotic variance-covariance is 
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formulated by the inverse of the original matrix I (β) = E[𝜕2 ln 𝐿/
𝜕𝛽𝜕𝛽´](Douc et al.,  2017) 
 
• Asymptotic efficiency – The maximum likelihood estimator which has 
a matrix variance-covariance that cannot be larger than the matrix 
variance-covariance of the others consistent and normally distributed 
estimators. (Greene, 2003) 
 
We will describe as Greene (2003) some measures of fitting the results given 
by the model. Starting by describing at least three that are used in papers for 
probability models. One is the Log-Likelihood function, the other is Log-interval 
method, and the third is the table of hits and misses.  If we use one of those, it has 
to give the maximized value of the log-likelihood function as the report 
computed with only a constant term can be good to see the behaviour.  
 
𝑙𝑛 𝐿0 =  𝑛 [𝑃 𝑙𝑛 𝑃 + (1  𝑃) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (1  𝑃)], denoting that P is the proportion of 
observations that are equal to 1.7 
We need to give some information also about the pseudo 𝑅2. This measure of 
fit no more no less than compares the constant term with the model used. This is 
only a very good measure statistically speaking if the result is zero as it is used 
the Poisson statistics Greene (2003). Considering all the data we have and for the 
specific fit method LRI, if the results obtained are between zero and one we 
cannot interpret and also we cannot take any idea that the LRI method increases 
as the fit model improves (Ribeiro,  2017). 
The last measure from the three that we need to describe is the table of hits 
and misses. This table  considers a probability of 50% that we should predict a 
                                                 
7 This text was retrieved on the Lecture slides of Prof. Ricardo Ribeiro in the year 2017(Ribeiro, 
2017) 
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one if says that the one has a higher probability than predicting a zero.(Ribeiro, 
2017). 
The last topic regarding the theoretical model is the marginal effects. As stated 
by (Williams, 1997) for discrete models, the marginal effects consider that a 
change from zero to one on the other variables at their means.  
 
Marginal Effect Xk =  Pr(Y =  1|X, Xk =  1) –  Pr(y = 1|X, Xk =  0) 
(5)  
Considering all the information provided above, we will try to give an answer 
to the following questions in the topics restructuring or insolvent companies 
1- Is the decision to enter the PER process influenced by relationship lending, 
measured by the number of banks that each company works with? 
2- Is the decision to enter the PER process influenced by its capital 
structure/leverage levels? 
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3.2. Data 
 
We have collected data from the CITIUS database for all the SME that have 
entered the PER process between 1st January from 2014 until 31st October 2017, 
achieving 4594 companies to analyse.  After this identification of companies in 
PER, we collected the required data from SABI database building a cross- section 
sample.  This data we had to split with the ones that are single persons with 
companies, which gave us the final data to be used of 1517 companies.  
 After that we also performed a comparison with companies that are in the 
same industry have the same turnover and the same total assets which gave the 
final sample. Considering the average company, 74 % of companies have PER 
process, work with more than 2 banks, have a turnover over 507,755 thousand 
euros and a ROA of 0,321.  
The considered companies are Portuguese SME´s companies, with a turnover 
of less than EUR 50 million, total assets less than EUR 43 million and less than 
250 employees.   
We use a similar model to Degryse, Masschelein, & Mitchell (2004) and 
Sapienza (2002), analysing the balance sheets and the number of banks in relation 
of those  SME.  
Our model analyses the probability of entering the PER process and has as 
independent variables the size of the companies, a measure of profitability ROA 
(Return on Assets), the number of banks that each company works with and 
leverage(Debt/Assets). With this last variable we can infer if the PER process that 
some companies enter depends on their capital structure. 
 
The model that we have used is the Probit model being the dependent variable 
the entering of the PER process. 
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The model is 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑗 =  β0 + β1𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗 + β2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗 + 𝜇𝑗 
(6) 
Second let us explain the variables of the model above.  
 
 Variables Definition 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
V
ar
ia
b
le
 
PER Process ( 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑗) 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒  
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑃𝐸𝑅 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠 0 
𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Number of Banks (𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑗) 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦  
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 
Size (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗) ln (𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟) 
Leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑗) 𝐿𝑛 (
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
) 
Return on Assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗) 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
 
 
The variable 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑗  is a dummy variable that observes the value one if the 
company is in PER process and zero otherwise.  Considering the independent 
variables, we want to understand the impact that the relationship lending has 
among capital structure on the probability of companies restructuring. The 
model that we use we only show which factors increase the probability of 
entering PER process, number of banks and capital structure.  For this analysis 
the most important independent variables are these that can capture the effects.  
As stated above on the literature review and also on the theoretical model, when 
a company has link, with more than one bank, information is not so valuable in 
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terms of loans.  So, for this reason, we expect a negative relation  of the number 
of banks that each company works with (𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑗) and the PER process as found 
in Degryse et al. (2004). As, the review of the literature says we use a measure of 
profitability. For this case, we have used the return on Assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗). The 
companies that have a higher profitability will tend to perform better and have 
less probability of insolvency.  This variable is also good because it is a measure 
of financing the activities of the company. Another variable that we have used is 
the size of each company (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗). For this, we have used the logarithm of the total 
turnover. The final independent variable that we used is leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑗). This is 
very used as said by Frank & Goyal (2003) the pecking-order-theory is one of the 
most important regarding corporate leverage.  Normally, if a company has to be 
financed externally, they have the preference of debt instead of equity. We can 
check that this preference is related to the lower cost of information when it is 
needed to send to financial institutions. More leveraged companies will be more 
subject to financial distress costs, and hence observe higher probability of PER 
process. 
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Chapter 4 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Preliminary Statistics 
 
Our main goal is to check the relationship between companies entering the 
PER process and relationship lending and capital structure (measured as 
leverage). On figure 2, we observe the relation between the PER process and 
leverage.  Figure 3 relates the size of the companies with the ones that have 
entered PER process. The figure 4 relates the PER process and the number of 
banks.  
 
Figure 2- PER process by Leverage 
 
Analysing Figure 2 above we observe higher leverage levels in the companies 
that already entered PER process. 
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Figure 3- Comparison of nr.Banks 
On the graph above figure 3 we can infer that the companies that have less 
leverage work with more banks as relationship lending is hence related to higher 
leverage levels. As the relationship lending increases the leverage level, the 
companies that want to have higher leverage they will have multiple relations.  
On this graph we can check a trend as on our sample the companies that are more 
efficient they have less bank relations. 
 
 
Table 1 - Preliminary Statistics  
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
PERP 0,741 1,000 0,438 0,000 1,000 
Banks 2,071 1,000 1,481 1,000 11,000 
Size 6,230 6,308 1,777 -1,273 10,446 
ROA -0,321 -0,007 7,122 -
272,668 
5,696 
Lev -0,115 -0,113 0,870 -5,925 7,175 
Nr. 1517 Observations 
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For companies that have PER Process* 
  
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Banks 2,010 1,000 1,454 1,000 9,000 
Size 5,832 5,978 1,697 -1,273 10,446 
ROA -0,443 -0,030 8,271 -272,668 5,696 
Lev 0,104 -0,012 0,770 -5,925 7,175 
*For 1124 Observations 
   
Table 2 -Probit model with PER 
For companies that don´t have PER Process* 
  
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Banks 2,244 2,000 1,546 1,000 11,000 
Size 7,367 7,635 1,488 0,588 10,730 
ROA 0,027 0,015 0,109 -0,688 0,700 
Lev -0,741 -0,512 0,835 -5,007 1,932 
*For 393 Observations 
   
Table 3 -Probit model without PER 
 
On table 1 we can observe that for the mean companies 74% entered in PER 
process, works with 2 banks, have more than 6 thousand euros in total assets but 
also, we observe that companies have a profitability ratio return on assets -0,321 
(debt/total assets) and leverage -0,115 for the data obtained of 1517 companies. 
We computed how many companies entered PER process and how many 
didn´t. On table 2 and 3 we can compare the same measures for the mean 
companies. We observe that companies that entered PER process work with 2 
banks, the total assets is 5 thousand euros compared to 7 thousand euros in 
companies that did not entered PER process. For the profitability ratio the value 
for the return on assets is -0,443 compared to 0,027 in companies that did not 
entered PER process.  The companies that entered PER process have in mean 
leverage of 0,104 compared to -0,741 for the companies that did not entered PER 
process. 
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4.2. Empirical Results 
 
In this part, we present the results of the estimation performed on the sample 
obtained so we can understand how the relationship lending relates to the 
companies having PER process.  As described previously the model used was the 
Probit model so we can estimate the coefficients, marginal effects of the 
independent variables compared to the dependent variables and last a prediction 
of the probability that the company will enter in a PER process. 
 
The results are described in table 4 
 
Table 4 - Probit model and Marginal Effects 
 
Probit 
Model 
Marginal effects 
Variables 
   
    
Banks 0,094*** 0,021*** 2,10%  
(0,029) -0,006 
 
Size -0,394*** -0,089*** -8,90%  
(0,042) (0,006) 
 
ROA -0,149962 -0,034 -3,40%  
(0,099) (0,024) 
 
Lev 0,892*** 0,202*** 20,20%  
(0,114) (0,012) 
 
Constant 3,315*** - 
 
 
(0,280) - 
 
Log L  -599,281 
  
 
     Pseudo  
 
0,310 
  
All specifications are for 1517 observations. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** Denotes p-
values<0.01, ** denote p-values <0.05, * denote p-values  
 
Analysing  table 4 we can see that there is a strong link between the probability 
of being in PER process and Leverage levels and also with the number of Banks 
that firms work with as this information is explained by Degryse et al. (2004). 
𝑅2 
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Regarding the size and the return on assets there is a negative relationship 
between this factor and the probability of entering a PER process. Considering 
the variable Banks there is a negative relationship between that and the 
companies that have PER process as informed by Degryse et al, (2004). They 
consider the probability of defaulting with the banks becomes shorter which 
gives to us the information that banks increase the information obtained. Last 
considering the coefficients we can say that the model is statistically significant.  
The marginal effects measure, is the expected change in the dependent 
variable in an independent variable, keeping all others constant. Considering this 
on table 4 we can check that a change on 1% on de PERP variable will lead to a 
change of 20,20% with the others constant and leads also to a change 2,1% on the 
number of banks. Those two described are the most relevant to our study here. 
One measure of goodness fit of the model is the table of hits and misses. 
Despite that (Greene, 2003) does not give so much importance about the value to 
use when considering this prediction, it is considered the normal probability to 
use og 0,50%. With our information, we have constructed the following table of 
hits and misses.  
 
 
 
 
Company has 
PER Process 
Company doesn´t has 
PER Process 
Total  
Observed 
Data 
Company 
has PER 
Process 
205 188 393 
Company 
doesn´t has 
PER 
Process 
52 1072 1124 
 Total 257 1260 1517 
Table 5 - Table hits and misses 
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As previously discussed we needed to predict the probability of a company in 
a situation of insolvency to enter in a PER process. In this case the results were 
 
Predict That a company will enter in PER 
  
Considering a 
probability  
 
0,5 
  
     
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
PERP 0,743 0,817 0,244 0,000 1,000 
Table 6 - Table of predictability 
From the table 6 we can say that on our sample the companies that are still not 
in PER process 74,3% will have in the future a PER process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
≥ 
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Chapter 5 
5. Conclusion 
 
With this master dissertation we study the impact of Relationship Lending and 
leverage on solvency conditions of SME companies. The main research question 
was “What is the impact of relationship lending in restructuring companies in 
Portugal?” In order to do so, we have collected from a public database the 
companies that entered the PER process and matched these with comparable to 
check those who were not, according to the company’s sizes, turnover and 
employees and computed through a regression model that could give a 
significant answer for our question by a probabilistic model.   
From the estimation, we found that there is a positive impact on the number 
of Banks that the companies work with and also with leverage. Those two were 
the most relevant but we have also considered others like the size and a measure 
of profitability. We have concluded that globally the model was statistically 
significant.  
To conclude, our results showed that for SME in Portugal there is a positive 
correlation between the probability of entering PER process with the leverage 
levels and also with the number of banks that the companies work with. Also, 
taking in consideration the size and the measure of profitability which is the 
return on assets, there is a negative correlation between these and the probability 
of entering PER process. With our model we had some disadvantages regarding 
the data required. The types of loans may be for future papers can lead to better 
results because we could check if the banks are borrowing with better 
information or not. With this, we could take other types of conclusions.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 4  
Probit - Full regression                                
    
       
 
Number of obs     =      1,517 
    
Wald chi2(4)      =     154.45 
    
Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -599.28089                 Pseudo R2         =     0.3095        
  
    
Robust 
    
PERP      Coef. Std. Err.   z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Banks 0,09431 0,02896 3,26000 0,00100 0,03755 0,15107 
size  -0,39378 0,04209 -9,36000 0,00000 -0,47627 -0,31129 
ROA  -0,14996 0,09931 -1,51000 0,13100 -0,34460 0,04468 
Lev  0,89201 0,11377 7,84000 0,00000 0,66902 1,11500 
_cons  3,31484 0,27992 11,84000 0,00000 2,76620 3,86348 
Average marginal effects                       
   
       
  Number of obs     =   1517 
    
       
       
                    Delta-method 
    
              dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
       
Banks 0,02139 0,00649 3,29000 0,00100 0,00866 0,03411 
size -0,08931 0,00579 -15,42000 0,00000 -0,10066 -0,07795 
ROA -0,03401 0,02369 -1,44000 0,15100 -0,08045 0,01243 
Lev 0,20230 0,01173 17,24000 0,00000 0,17930 0,22530 
 
